Re: Cutting support for OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 in 17~?

Peter Eisentraut <peter@eisentraut.org>

From: Peter Eisentraut <peter@eisentraut.org>
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Cc: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>, Jacob Champion <jacob.champion@enterprisedb.com>, Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>, Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>, mikael.kjellstrom@gmail.com, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Date: 2024-04-10T07:31:16Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers
On 06.04.24 19:47, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
> In bumping we want to move to 1.1.1 since that's the first version with the
> rewritten RNG which is fork-safe by design, something PostgreSQL clearly
> benefits from.

I think it might be better to separate this into two steps:

1. Move to 1.1.0.  This is an API update.  Change OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, 
and remove a bunch of code that no longer needs to be conditional.  We 
could check for a representative function like OPENSSL_init_ssl() in 
configure/meson, or we could just let the compilation fail with older 
versions.

2. Move to 1.1.1.  I understand this has to do with the fork-safety of 
pg_strong_random(), and it's not an API change but a behavior change. 
Let's make this association clearer in the code.  For example, add a 
version check or assertion about this into pg_strong_random() itself.

I don't know how LibreSSL interacts with either of these two points. 
That's something that could be clearer.

Some more detailed review on the v6 patch:

* doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml

This small documentation patch could be committed forthwith.

* src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c

+#include <openssl/bn.h>

This patch doesn't appear to add anything, so why does it need a new 
include?

Could the additions of SSL_OP_NO_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION and 
SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW be separate patches?

* src/common/hmac_openssl.c

There appears to be some unrelated refactoring happening here?

* src/include/common/openssl.h

Is the comment no longer applicable to OpenSSL, only to LibreSSL?

* src/port/pg_strong_random.c

I would prefer to remove pg_strong_random_init() if it's no longer 
useful.  I mean, if we leave it as is, and we are not removing any 
callers, then we are effectively continuing to support OpenSSL <1.1.1, 
right?




Commits

Same data as JSON: GET /api/v1/messages/:b64id/commits the thread's linked commits as JSON, with link sources. API reference →
  1. Remove obsolete unconstify()

  2. Only perform pg_strong_random init when required

  3. Remove support for OpenSSL older than 1.1.0

  4. Support SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW when using LibreSSL

  5. Support disallowing SSL renegotiation when using LibreSSL

  6. Doc: Use past tense for things which happened in the past

  7. Remove support for OpenSSL 1.0.1

  8. Remove support for OpenSSL 0.9.8 and 1.0.0