Horton

Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com>

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From: Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com>
To: Antonin Houska <ah@cybertec.at>, Tomas Vondra <tomas.vondra@2ndquadrant.com>
Cc: Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>, Ryan Lambert <ryan@rustprooflabs.com>, Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>, Masahiko Sawada <sawada.mshk@gmail.com>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>, Haribabu Kommi <kommi.haribabu@gmail.com>, "Moon, Insung" <Moon_Insung_i3@lab.ntt.co.jp>, Ibrar Ahmed <ibrar.ahmad@gmail.com>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>
Date: 2019-07-10T12:25:27Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers

Commits

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  1. Revamp the WAL record format.

On 7/10/19 4:47 AM, Antonin Houska wrote:
> Tomas Vondra <tomas.vondra@2ndquadrant.com> wrote:
>> I don't think that works, because that'd mean we're encrypting the same
>> page with the same nonce over and over, which means reusing the reuse
>> (even if you hash/encrypt it). Or did I miss something?
> 
> I found out that it's wrong to use the same key (or (key, IV) pair) to encrypt
> different plain texts [1], however this is about *stream cipher*. There should
> be some evidence that *block cipher* has similar weakness before we accept
> another restriction on the IV setup.
> 
> [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stream_cipher_attacks#Reused_key_attack

There is plenty of guidance that specifies CBC requires unique,
unpredictable, but not necessarily secret IV. See for example Appendix C
here:

https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38a.pdf

Joe

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