Re: pg_amcheck option to install extension
Mark Dilger <mark.dilger@enterprisedb.com>
From: Mark Dilger <mark.dilger@enterprisedb.com>
To: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
Cc: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>,
Andrew Dunstan <andrew@dunslane.net>,
Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@alvh.no-ip.org>,
PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>
Date: 2021-04-20T05:31:18Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers
> On Apr 19, 2021, at 9:22 PM, Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz> wrote: > > On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 08:39:06PM -0700, Mark Dilger wrote: >> This is a classic privilege escalation attack. Bob has one >> privilege, and uses it to get another. > > Bob is a superuser, so it has all the privileges of the world for this > instance. In what is that different from BASE_BACKUP or just COPY > FROM PROGRAM? I think you are conflating the concept of an operating system adminstrator with the concept of the database superuser/owner. If the operating system user that postgres is running as cannot execute any binaries, then "copy from program" is not a way for a database admistrator to escape the jail. If Bob does not have ssh access to the system, he cannot run pg_basebackup. > I am not following your argument here. The argument is that the operating system user that postgres is running as, perhaps user "postgres", can read the files in the $PGDATA directory, but Bob can only see the MVCC view of the data, not the raw data. Installing contrib/amcheck allows Bob to get a peak behind the curtain. — Mark Dilger EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company
Commits
-
Provide pg_amcheck with an --install-missing option
- b859d94c6389 14.0 landed