Re: role self-revocation

Mark Dilger <mark.dilger@enterprisedb.com>

From: Mark Dilger <mark.dilger@enterprisedb.com>
To: Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>
Cc: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>, "David G. Johnston" <david.g.johnston@gmail.com>, Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>, Joshua Brindle <joshua.brindle@crunchydata.com>, Andrew Dunstan <andrew@dunslane.net>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>
Date: 2022-03-07T20:03:55Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers

> On Mar 7, 2022, at 12:01 PM, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> It's been pointed out upthread that this would have undesirable
> security implications, because the admin option would be inherited,
> and the implicit permission isn't.

Right, but with a reflexive self-admin-option, we could document that it works in a non-inherited way.  We'd just be saying the current hard-coded behavior is an option which can be revoked rather than something you're stuck with.

—
Mark Dilger
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company






Commits

  1. Make role grant system more consistent with other privileges.

  2. Ensure that pg_auth_members.grantor is always valid.

  3. Remove the ability of a role to administer itself.

  4. Add tests of the CREATEROLE attribute

  5. Replace explicit PIN entries in pg_depend with an OID range test.

  6. Shore up ADMIN OPTION restrictions.

  7. Add pg_has_role() family of privilege inquiry functions modeled after the

  8. Align GRANT/REVOKE behavior more closely with the SQL spec, per discussion