Re: Internal key management system

Hi, 

On February 8, 2020 7:08:26 AM PST, Tomas Vondra <tomas.vondra@2ndquadrant.com> wrote:
>On Sat, Feb 08, 2020 at 02:48:54PM +0900, Masahiko Sawada wrote:
>>On Sat, 8 Feb 2020 at 03:24, Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> On 2020-02-07 20:44:31 +0900, Masahiko Sawada wrote:
>>> > Yeah I'm not going to use pgcrypto for transparent data
>encryption.
>>> > The KMS patch includes the new basic infrastructure for
>cryptographic
>>> > functions (mainly AES-CBC). I'm thinking we can expand that
>>> > infrastructure so that we can also use it for TDE purpose by
>>> > supporting new cryptographic functions such as AES-CTR. Anyway, I
>>> > agree to not have it depend on pgcrypto.
>>>
>>> I thought for a minute, before checking the patch, that you were
>saying
>>> above that the KMS patch includes its *own* implementation of
>>> cryptographic functions.  I think it's pretty crucial that it
>continues
>>> not to do that...
>>
>>I meant that we're going to use OpenSSL for AES encryption and
>>decryption independent of pgcrypto's openssl code, as the first step.
>>That is, KMS is available only when configured --with-openssl. And
>>hopefully we eventually merge these openssl code and have pgcrypto use
>>it, like when we introduced SCRAM.
>>
>
>I don't think it's very likely we'll ever merge any openssl code into
>our repository, e.g. because of licensing. But we already have AES
>implementation in pgcrypto - why not to use that? I'm not saying we
>should make this depend on pgcrypto, but maybe we should move the AES
>library from pgcrypto into src/common or something like that.

The code uses functions exposed by openssl, it doesn't copy there code.

And no, I don't think we should copy the implemented from pgcrypto - it's not good. We should remove it entirely.

Andres

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