Horton

Re: [PoC] Federated Authn/z with OAUTHBEARER

Jacob Champion <jacob.champion@enterprisedb.com>

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From: Jacob Champion <jacob.champion@enterprisedb.com>
To: Ivan Kush <ivan.kush@tantorlabs.com>
Cc: PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>
Date: 2025-05-01T20:41:30Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers

Commits

Same data as JSON: GET /api/v1/messages/:b64id/commits the thread's linked commits as JSON, with link sources. API reference →

  1. meson: Fix install-quiet after clean

  2. oauth: Run Autoconf tests with correct compiler flags

  3. Link libpq with libdl if the platform needs that.

  4. Doc: correct spelling of meson switch.

  5. oauth: Correct SSL dependency for libpq-oauth.a

  6. oauth: Fix Autoconf build on macOS

  7. oauth: Move the builtin flow into a separate module

  8. Remove a stray "pgrminclude" annotation

  9. oauth: Simplify copy of PGoauthBearerRequest

  10. oauth: Improve validator docs on interruptibility

  11. oauth: Disallow synchronous DNS in libcurl

  12. oauth: Fix postcondition for set_timer on macOS

  13. oauth: Use IPv4-only issuer in oauth_validator tests

  14. Work around OAuth/EVFILT_TIMER quirk on NetBSD.

  15. oauth: Fix incorrect const markers in struct

  16. Add missing entry to oauth_validator test .gitignore

  17. cirrus: Temporarily fix libcurl link error

  18. Add support for OAUTHBEARER SASL mechanism

  19. libpq: Handle asynchronous actions during SASL

  20. require_auth: prepare for multiple SASL mechanisms

  21. Move PG_MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_LENGTH to libpq/auth.h

  22. Make SASL max message length configurable

  23. jsonapi: fully initialize dummy lexer

  24. common/jsonapi: support libpq as a client

  25. Remove fe_memutils from libpgcommon_shlib

  26. Revert ECPG's use of pnstrdup()

  27. Explicitly require password for SCRAM exchange

  28. Refactor SASL exchange to return tri-state status

On Mon, Apr 21, 2025 at 9:57 AM Jacob Champion
<jacob.champion@enterprisedb.com> wrote:
> So to recap: I'm happy to add a Google compatibility mode, but I'd
> like to gather some evidence that their device flow can actually
> authorize tokens for third parties safely, before we commit to that.
> Thoughts?

Hi Ivan, I know the thread has been deep in discussion around the
module split, but I was wondering if you'd had any thoughts on the
Google safety problem?

--Jacob