Horton

Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

Ryan Lambert <ryan@rustprooflabs.com>

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From: Ryan Lambert <ryan@rustprooflabs.com>
To: Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com>
Cc: Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>, Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com>, Antonin Houska <ah@cybertec.at>, Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>, Masahiko Sawada <sawada.mshk@gmail.com>, Tomas Vondra <tomas.vondra@2ndquadrant.com>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>, Haribabu Kommi <kommi.haribabu@gmail.com>, "Moon, Insung" <Moon_Insung_i3@lab.ntt.co.jp>, Ibrar Ahmed <ibrar.ahmad@gmail.com>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>
Date: 2019-07-10T18:38:02Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers

Commits

Same data as JSON: GET /api/v1/messages/:b64id/commits the thread's linked commits as JSON, with link sources. API reference →

  1. Revamp the WAL record format.

> what is it that gets stored in the page for
> decryption use, the nonce or the IV derived from it?


I believe storing the IV is preferable and still secure per [1]: "The IV
need not be secret"

Beyond needing the database oid, if every decrypt function has to
regenerate the IV from the nonce that will affect performance.  I don't
know how expensive the forward hash is but it won't be free.

[1]
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38a.pdf



*Ryan Lambert*