Re: Direct SSL connection with ALPN and HBA rules

Jelte Fennema-Nio <postgres@jeltef.nl>

From: Jelte Fennema-Nio <postgres@jeltef.nl>
To: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
Cc: Jacob Champion <jacob.champion@enterprisedb.com>, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>, Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>, Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>
Date: 2024-05-13T13:55:48Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers
On Mon, 13 May 2024 at 15:38, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi> wrote:
> Here's a patch to implement that.

+       if (conn->sslnegotiation[0] == 'd' &&
+           conn->sslmode[0] != 'r' && conn->sslmode[0] != 'v')

I think these checks should use strcmp instead of checking magic first
characters. I see this same clever trick is used in the recently added
init_allowed_encryption_methods, and I think that should be changed to
use strcmp too for readability.



Commits

  1. Remove option to fall back from direct to postgres SSL negotiation

  2. Reject SSL connection if ALPN is used but there's no common protocol

  3. libpq: Enforce ALPN in direct SSL connections

  4. libpq: If ALPN is not used, make PQsslAttribute(conn, "alpn") == ""

  5. Fix documentation and comments on what happens after GSS rejection

  6. doc: Add note to prevent server spoofing with SCRAM