Re: Direct SSL connection with ALPN and HBA rules
Jelte Fennema-Nio <postgres@jeltef.nl>
From: Jelte Fennema-Nio <postgres@jeltef.nl>
To: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
Cc: Jacob Champion <jacob.champion@enterprisedb.com>,
Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>, Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>, Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>
Date: 2024-05-13T13:55:48Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers
On Mon, 13 May 2024 at 15:38, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi> wrote: > Here's a patch to implement that. + if (conn->sslnegotiation[0] == 'd' && + conn->sslmode[0] != 'r' && conn->sslmode[0] != 'v') I think these checks should use strcmp instead of checking magic first characters. I see this same clever trick is used in the recently added init_allowed_encryption_methods, and I think that should be changed to use strcmp too for readability.
Commits
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Remove option to fall back from direct to postgres SSL negotiation
- fb5718f35ff6 17.0 landed
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Reject SSL connection if ALPN is used but there's no common protocol
- 17a834a04d5a 17.0 landed
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libpq: Enforce ALPN in direct SSL connections
- 03a0e0d4bb78 17.0 landed
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libpq: If ALPN is not used, make PQsslAttribute(conn, "alpn") == ""
- 3c184092651b 17.0 landed
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Fix documentation and comments on what happens after GSS rejection
- 5c9f35fc48ea 17.0 landed
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doc: Add note to prevent server spoofing with SCRAM
- d0f4824a5410 16.0 cited