Re: initdb recommendations

Dave Cramer <pg@fastcrypt.com>

From: Dave Cramer <pg@fastcrypt.com>
To: Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com>
Cc: Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>, "Jonathan S. Katz" <jkatz@postgresql.org>, Peter Eisentraut <peter.eisentraut@2ndquadrant.com>, pgsql-hackers <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>, Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>, Magnus Hagander <magnus@hagander.net>
Date: 2019-05-24T12:01:13Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers, pgsql-docs
On Fri, 24 May 2019 at 07:48, Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com> wrote:

> On 5/23/19 10:30 PM, Stephen Frost wrote:
> > Greetings,
> >
> > * Tom Lane (tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote:
> >> "Jonathan S. Katz" <jkatz@postgresql.org> writes:
> >> > For now I have left in the password based method to be scram-sha-256
> as
> >> > I am optimistic about the support across client drivers[1] (and FWIW I
> >> > have an implementation for crystal-pg ~60% done).
> >>
> >> > However, this probably means we would need to set the default password
> >> > encryption guc to "scram-sha-256" which we're not ready to do yet, so
> it
> >> > may be moot to leave it in.
> >>
> >> > So, thinking out loud about that, we should probably use "md5" and
> once
> >> > we decide to make the encryption method "scram-sha-256" by default,
> then
> >> > we update the recommendation?
> >>
> >> Meh.  If we're going to break things, let's break them.  Set it to
> >> scram by default and let people who need to cope with old clients
> >> change the default.  I'm tired of explaining that MD5 isn't actually
> >> insecure in our usage ...
> >
> > +many.
>
> many++
>
> Are we doing this for pg12? In any case, I would think we better loudly
> point out this change somewhere.
>
>
+many as well given the presumption that we are going to break existing
behaviour

Dave

Commits

  1. initdb: Change authentication defaults