Horton

Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

Masahiko Sawada <sawada.mshk@gmail.com>

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From: Masahiko Sawada <sawada.mshk@gmail.com>
To: Sehrope Sarkuni <sehrope@jackdb.com>
Cc: "Jonathan S. Katz" <jkatz@postgresql.org>, Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>, Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com>, Antonin Houska <ah@cybertec.at>, Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>, Tomas Vondra <tomas.vondra@2ndquadrant.com>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>, Haribabu Kommi <kommi.haribabu@gmail.com>, "Moon, Insung" <Moon_Insung_i3@lab.ntt.co.jp>, Ibrar Ahmed <ibrar.ahmad@gmail.com>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>
Date: 2019-07-30T12:14:03Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers

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Same data as JSON: GET /api/v1/messages/:b64id/commits the thread's linked commits as JSON, with link sources. API reference →

  1. Revamp the WAL record format.

On Mon, Jul 29, 2019 at 8:18 PM Sehrope Sarkuni <sehrope@jackdb.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jul 29, 2019 at 6:42 AM Masahiko Sawada <sawada.mshk@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > An argument could be made to push that problem upstream, i.e. let the
> > > supplier of the passphrase deal with the indirection. You would still
> > > need to verify the supplied passphrase/key is correct via something
> > > like authenticating against a stored MAC.
> >
> > So do we need the key for MAC of passphrase/key in order to verify?
>
> Yes. Any 128 or 256-bit value is a valid AES key and any 16-byte input
> can be "decrypted" with it in both CTR and CBC mode, you'll just end
> up with garbage data if the key does not match. Verification of the
> key prior to usage (i.e. starting DB and encrypting/decrypting data)
> is a must as otherwise you'll end up with all kinds of corruption or
> data loss.
>

Do you mean that we encrypt and store a 16 byte input with the correct
key to the disk, and then decrypt it with the user supplied key and
compare the result to the input data?

> From a single user supplied passphrase you would derive the MDEK and
> compute a MAC (either using the same key or via a separate derived
> MDEK-MAC key). If the computed MAC matches against the previously
> stored value then you know the MDEK is correct as well.

You meant KEK, not MDEK?

Regards,

--
Masahiko Sawada
NIPPON TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CORPORATION
NTT Open Source Software Center