Re: Letting the client choose the protocol to use during a SASL exchange

Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>

From: Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>
To: Craig Ringer <craig.ringer@2ndquadrant.com>
Cc: Álvaro Hernández Tortosa <aht@8kdata.com>, PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>, Simon Riggs <simon@2ndquadrant.com>, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Date: 2017-04-14T12:26:44Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers
On Fri, Apr 14, 2017 at 8:28 PM, Craig Ringer
<craig.ringer@2ndquadrant.com> wrote:
> There's no point advertising scram-512 if only -256 can work for 'bob'
> because that's what we have in pg_authid.

The possibility to have multiple verifiers has other benefits than
that, password rolling being one. We may want to revisit that once
there is a need to have a pg_auth_verifiers, my intuition on the
matter is that we are years away from it, but we'll very likely need
it for more reasons than the one you are raising here.

> Yes, filtering the advertised mechs exposes info. But not being able to log
> in if you're the legitimate user without configuring the client with your
> password hash format would suck too.

Yup.
-- 
Michael


Commits

  1. Improve the SASL authentication protocol.

  2. Refactor libpq authentication request processing.

  3. Minor cleanup of backend SCRAM code.