Re: Letting the client choose the protocol to use during a SASL exchange
Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>
From: Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>
To: Craig Ringer <craig.ringer@2ndquadrant.com>
Cc: Álvaro Hernández Tortosa <aht@8kdata.com>, PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>, Simon Riggs <simon@2ndquadrant.com>, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Date: 2017-04-14T12:26:44Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers
On Fri, Apr 14, 2017 at 8:28 PM, Craig Ringer <craig.ringer@2ndquadrant.com> wrote: > There's no point advertising scram-512 if only -256 can work for 'bob' > because that's what we have in pg_authid. The possibility to have multiple verifiers has other benefits than that, password rolling being one. We may want to revisit that once there is a need to have a pg_auth_verifiers, my intuition on the matter is that we are years away from it, but we'll very likely need it for more reasons than the one you are raising here. > Yes, filtering the advertised mechs exposes info. But not being able to log > in if you're the legitimate user without configuring the client with your > password hash format would suck too. Yup. -- Michael
Commits
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Improve the SASL authentication protocol.
- 4f3b87ab780b 10.0 landed
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Refactor libpq authentication request processing.
- 61bf96cab063 10.0 landed
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Minor cleanup of backend SCRAM code.
- 00707fa58275 10.0 landed