Horton

Re: Password identifiers, protocol aging and SCRAM protocol

Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>

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From: Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>
To: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
Cc: David Steele <david@pgmasters.net>, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>, David Fetter <david@fetter.org>, Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com>, Magnus Hagander <magnus@hagander.net>, Peter Eisentraut <peter.eisentraut@2ndquadrant.com>, Julian Markwort <julian.markwort@uni-muenster.de>, Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>, PostgreSQL mailing lists <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>, Valery Popov <v.popov@postgrespro.ru>
Date: 2016-09-27T13:48:24Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers 
On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 10:42 PM, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi> wrote:
> The libpq-side is not. Just calling random() won't do. We haven't needed for
> random numbers in libpq before, but now we do. Is the pgcrypto solution
> portable enough that we can use it in libpq?

Do you think that urandom would be enough then? The last time I took a
look at that, I saw urandom on all modern platforms even those ones:
OpenBSD, NetBSD, Solaris, SunOS. For Windows the CryptGen stuff would
be nice enough I guess..
-- 
Michael

Commits

  1. Support SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication (RFC 5802 and 7677).

  2. Refactor SHA2 functions and move them to src/common/.

  3. Replace isMD5() with a more future-proof way to check if pw is encrypted.

  4. Remove bogus notice that older clients might not work with MD5 passwords.

  5. Refactor the code for verifying user's password.

  6. Replace PostmasterRandom() with a stronger source, second attempt.

  7. Remove support for (insecure) crypt authentication.