Re: Internal key management system
Masahiko Sawada <masahiko.sawada@2ndquadrant.com>
From: Masahiko Sawada <masahiko.sawada@2ndquadrant.com>
To: Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
Cc: Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>, Fabien COELHO <coelho@cri.ensmp.fr>, PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>,
Sehrope Sarkuni <sehrope@jackdb.com>, cary huang <hcary328@gmail.com>, "Moon,
Insung" <tsukiwamoon.pgsql@gmail.com>, Ibrar Ahmed <ibrar.ahmad@gmail.com>, Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com>, Bruce Momjian <bruce.momjian@enterprisedb.com>
Date: 2020-02-08T05:48:54Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers
On Sat, 8 Feb 2020 at 03:24, Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> wrote: > > Hi, > > On 2020-02-07 20:44:31 +0900, Masahiko Sawada wrote: > > Yeah I'm not going to use pgcrypto for transparent data encryption. > > The KMS patch includes the new basic infrastructure for cryptographic > > functions (mainly AES-CBC). I'm thinking we can expand that > > infrastructure so that we can also use it for TDE purpose by > > supporting new cryptographic functions such as AES-CTR. Anyway, I > > agree to not have it depend on pgcrypto. > > I thought for a minute, before checking the patch, that you were saying > above that the KMS patch includes its *own* implementation of > cryptographic functions. I think it's pretty crucial that it continues > not to do that... I meant that we're going to use OpenSSL for AES encryption and decryption independent of pgcrypto's openssl code, as the first step. That is, KMS is available only when configured --with-openssl. And hopefully we eventually merge these openssl code and have pgcrypto use it, like when we introduced SCRAM. Regards, -- Masahiko Sawada http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/ PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services