Re: storing an explicit nonce
Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>
From: Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>
To: Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Cc: Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>, Ants Aasma <ants@cybertec.at>,
Sasasu <i@sasa.su>, PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>
Date: 2021-10-12T14:26:54Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers
Commits
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the thread's linked commits as JSON, with link sources.
API reference →
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Rethink method for assigning OIDs to the template0 and postgres DBs.
- 2cb1272445d2 15.0 landed
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pg_upgrade: Preserve database OIDs.
- aa01051418f1 15.0 landed
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pg_upgrade: Preserve relfilenodes and tablespace OIDs.
- 9a974cbcba00 15.0 landed
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Fix for new Boolean node
- cf925936ecc0 15.0 cited
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Improve error handling of HMAC computations
- 5513dc6a304d 15.0 cited
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Add macro RelationIsPermanent() to report relation permanence
- 95d77149c535 14.0 landed
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Enhance nbtree index tuple deletion.
- d168b666823b 14.0 cited
On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 11:05 PM Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net> wrote: > Sure, I get that. Would be awesome if all these things were clearly > documented somewhere but I've never been able to find it quite as > explicitly laid out as one would like. :-( > specifically: Appendix C: Tweaks > > Quoting a couple of paragraphs from that appendix: > > """ > In general, if there is information that is available and statically > associated with a plaintext, it is recommended to use that information > as a tweak for the plaintext. Ideally, the non-secret tweak associated > with a plaintext is associated only with that plaintext. > > Extensive tweaking means that fewer plaintexts are encrypted under any > given tweak. This corresponds, in the security model that is described > in [1], to fewer queries to the target instance of the encryption. > """ > > The gist of this being- the more diverse the tweaking being used, the > better. That's where I was going with my "limit the risk" comment. If > we can make the tweak vary more for a given encryption invokation, > that's going to be better, pretty much by definition, and as explained > in publications by NIST. I mean I don't have anything against that appendix, but I think we need to understand - with confidence - what the expectations are specifically around XTS, and that appendix seems much more general than that. -- Robert Haas EDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com