Horton

Re: Password identifiers, protocol aging and SCRAM protocol

Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>

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From: Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>
To: Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>
Cc: David Fetter <david@fetter.org>, Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com>, Magnus Hagander <magnus@hagander.net>, Peter Eisentraut <peter.eisentraut@2ndquadrant.com>, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>, Julian Markwort <julian.markwort@uni-muenster.de>, Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>, David Steele <david@pgmasters.net>, PostgreSQL mailing lists <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>, Valery Popov <v.popov@postgrespro.ru>
Date: 2016-07-21T16:19:29Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers 
On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 7:42 PM, Michael Paquier
<michael.paquier@gmail.com> wrote:
>> People have, in the past, expressed concerns about linking in
>> pgcrypto.  Apparently, in some countries, it's a legal problem.
>
> Do you have any references? I don't see that as a problem.

I don't have a link to previous discussion handy, but I definitely
recall that it's been discussed.  I don't think that would mean that
libpgcrypto couldn't depend on libpgcommon, but the reverse direction
would make libpgcrypto essentially mandatory which I don't think is a
direction we want to go for both technical and legal reasons.

-- 
Robert Haas
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company

Commits

  1. Support SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication (RFC 5802 and 7677).

  2. Refactor SHA2 functions and move them to src/common/.

  3. Replace isMD5() with a more future-proof way to check if pw is encrypted.

  4. Remove bogus notice that older clients might not work with MD5 passwords.

  5. Refactor the code for verifying user's password.

  6. Replace PostmasterRandom() with a stronger source, second attempt.

  7. Remove support for (insecure) crypt authentication.