Re: Password identifiers, protocol aging and SCRAM protocol

Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>

From: Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>
To: Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Eisentraut <peter.eisentraut@2ndquadrant.com>, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>, David Steele <david@pgmasters.net>, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>, David Fetter <david@fetter.org>, Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com>, Magnus Hagander <magnus@hagander.net>, Julian Markwort <julian.markwort@uni-muenster.de>, Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>, PostgreSQL mailing lists <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>, Valery Popov <v.popov@postgrespro.ru>
Date: 2016-11-15T20:40:03Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers
On Tue, Nov 15, 2016 at 2:24 PM, Michael Paquier
<michael.paquier@gmail.com> wrote:
> How do you plug in that with OpenSSL? Are you suggesting to use a set
> of undef definitions in the new header in the same way as pgcrypto is
> doing, which is rather ugly? Because that's what the deal is about in
> this patch.

Perhaps that justifies renaming them -- although I would think the
fact that they are static would prevent conflicts -- but why reorder
them and change variable names?

-- 
Robert Haas
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company


Commits

  1. Support SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication (RFC 5802 and 7677).

  2. Refactor SHA2 functions and move them to src/common/.

  3. Replace isMD5() with a more future-proof way to check if pw is encrypted.

  4. Remove bogus notice that older clients might not work with MD5 passwords.

  5. Refactor the code for verifying user's password.

  6. Replace PostmasterRandom() with a stronger source, second attempt.

  7. Remove support for (insecure) crypt authentication.