Re: documenting the backup manifest file format

On Mon, Apr 13, 2020 at 3:34 PM Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com> wrote:
> Are these hex figures upper or lower case?  No leading zeroes?  This
> would normally not matter, but the toplevel checksum will care.

Not really. You just feed the whole file except for the last line
through shasum and you get the answer.

It so happens that the server generates lower-case, but
pg_verifybackup will accept either.

Leading zeroes are not omitted. If the checksum's not the right
length, it ain't gonna work. If SHA is used, it's the same output you
would get from running shasum -a<whatever> on the file, which is
certainly a fixed length. I assumed that this followed from the
statement that there are two characters per byte in the checksum, and
from the fact that no checksum algorithm I know about drops leading
zeroes in the output.

> Also, I
> see no mention of prettification-chars such as newlines or indentation.
> I suppose if I pass a manifest file through prettification (or Windows
> newline conversion), the checksum may break.

It would indeed break. I'm not sure what you want me to say here,
though. If you're trying to parse a manifest, you shouldn't care about
how the whitespace is arranged. If you're trying to generate one, you
can arrange it any way you like, as long as you also include it in the
checksum.

> As for Last-Modification, I think the spec should indicate the exact
> format that's used, because it'll also be critical for checksumming.

Again, I don't think it really matters for checksumming, but it's
"YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS TZ" format, where TZ is always GMT.

> Why is the top-level checksum only allowed to be SHA-256, if the files
> can use up to SHA-512?

If we allowed the top-level checksum to be changed to something else,
then we'd probably we want to indicate which kind of checksum is being
used at the beginning of the file, so as to enable incremental parsing
with checksum verification at the end. pg_verifybackup doesn't
currently do incremental parsing, but I'd like to add that sometime,
if I get time to hash out the details. I think the use case for
varying the checksum type of the manifest itself is much less than for
varying it for the files. The big problem with checksumming the files
is that it can be slow, because the files can be big. However, unless
you have a truckload of empty files in the database, the manifest is
going to be very small compared to the sizes of all the files, so it
seemed harmless to use a stronger checksum algorithm for the manifest
itself. Maybe someone with a ton of empty or nearly-empty relations
will complain, but they can always use --no-manifest if they want.

I agree that it's a little bit weird that you can have a stronger
checksum for the files instead of the manifest itself, but I also
wonder what the use case would be for using a stronger checksum on the
manifest. David Steele argued that strong checksums on the files could
be useful to software that wants to rifle through all the backups
you've ever taken and find another copy of that file by looking for
something with a matching checksum. CRC-32C wouldn't be strong enough
for that, because eventually you could have enough files that you
start to have collisions. The SHA algorithms output enough bits to
make that quite unlikely. But this argument only makes sense for the
files, not the manifest.

Naturally, all this is arguable, though, and a good deal of arguing
about it has been done, as you have probably noticed. I am still of
the opinion that if somebody's goal is to use this facility for its
intended purpose, which is to find out whether your backup got
corrupted, any of these algorithms are fine, and are highly likely to
tell you that you have a problem if, in fact, you do. In fact, I bet
that even a checksum algorithm considerably stupider than anything I'd
actually consider using would accomplish that goal in a high
percentage of cases. But not everybody agrees with me, to the point
where I am starting to wonder if I really understand how computers
work.

> (Also, did we intentionally omit the dash in
> hash names, so "SHA-256" to make it SHA256?  This will also be critical
> for checksumming the manifest itself.)

I debated this with myself, settled on this spelling, and nobody
complained until now. It could be changed, though. I didn't have any
particular reason for choosing it except the feeling that people would
probably prefer to type --manifest-checksum=sha256 rather than
--manifest-checksum=sha-256.

-- 
Robert Haas
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company