Re: storing an explicit nonce
Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>
From: Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>
To: Ashwin Agrawal <ashwinstar@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>, Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>,
Ants Aasma <ants@cybertec.at>, Sasasu <i@sasa.su>, PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>
Date: 2021-10-07T19:38:28Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers
Commits
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the thread's linked commits as JSON, with link sources.
API reference →
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Rethink method for assigning OIDs to the template0 and postgres DBs.
- 2cb1272445d2 15.0 landed
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pg_upgrade: Preserve database OIDs.
- aa01051418f1 15.0 landed
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pg_upgrade: Preserve relfilenodes and tablespace OIDs.
- 9a974cbcba00 15.0 landed
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Fix for new Boolean node
- cf925936ecc0 15.0 cited
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Improve error handling of HMAC computations
- 5513dc6a304d 15.0 cited
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Add macro RelationIsPermanent() to report relation permanence
- 95d77149c535 14.0 landed
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Enhance nbtree index tuple deletion.
- d168b666823b 14.0 cited
On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 3:31 PM Ashwin Agrawal <ashwinstar@gmail.com> wrote: > Not at all knowledgeable on security topics (bravely using terms and recommendation), can we approach decisions like AES-XTS vs AES-GCM (which in turn decides whether we need to store nonce or not) based on which compliance it can achieve or not. Like can using AES-XTS make it FIPS 140-2 compliant or not? To the best of my knowledge, the encryption mode doesn't have much to do with whether such compliance can be achieved. The encryption algorithm could matter, but I assume everyone still thinks AES is acceptable. (We should assume that will eventually change.) The encryption mode is, at least as I understand, more of an internal thing that you have to get right to avoid having people break your encryption and write papers about how they did it. -- Robert Haas EDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com