Horton

Re: Password identifiers, protocol aging and SCRAM protocol

Peter Eisentraut <peter.eisentraut@2ndquadrant.com>

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From: Peter Eisentraut <peter.eisentraut@2ndquadrant.com>
To: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>, Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>
Cc: Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>, Julian Markwort <julian.markwort@uni-muenster.de>, Magnus Hagander <magnus@hagander.net>, Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>, David Steele <david@pgmasters.net>, PostgreSQL mailing lists <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>, Valery Popov <v.popov@postgrespro.ru>
Date: 2016-07-03T21:34:00Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers 
On 7/2/16 3:54 PM, Heikki Linnakangas wrote:
> In related news, RFC 7677 that describes a new SCRAM-SHA-256
> authentication mechanism, was published in November 2015. It's identical
> to SCRAM-SHA-1, which is what this patch set implements, except that
> SHA-1 has been replaced with SHA-256. Perhaps we should forget about
> SCRAM-SHA-1 and jump straight to SCRAM-SHA-256.

I think a global change from SHA-1 to SHA-256 is in the air already, so 
if we're going to release something brand new in 2017 or so, it should 
be SHA-256.

I suspect this would be a relatively simple change, so I wouldn't mind 
seeing a SHA-1-based variant in CF1 to get things rolling.

-- 
Peter Eisentraut              http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services

Commits

  1. Support SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication (RFC 5802 and 7677).

  2. Refactor SHA2 functions and move them to src/common/.

  3. Replace isMD5() with a more future-proof way to check if pw is encrypted.

  4. Remove bogus notice that older clients might not work with MD5 passwords.

  5. Refactor the code for verifying user's password.

  6. Replace PostmasterRandom() with a stronger source, second attempt.

  7. Remove support for (insecure) crypt authentication.