Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com>

From: Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com>
To: Sehrope Sarkuni <sehrope@jackdb.com>, Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
Cc: Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com>, Tomas Vondra <tomas.vondra@2ndquadrant.com>, Antonin Houska <ah@cybertec.at>, Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>, Masahiko Sawada <sawada.mshk@gmail.com>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>, Haribabu Kommi <kommi.haribabu@gmail.com>, "Moon, Insung" <Moon_Insung_i3@lab.ntt.co.jp>, Ibrar Ahmed <ibrar.ahmad@gmail.com>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>
Date: 2019-07-27T19:08:44Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers

Commits

Same data as JSON: GET /api/v1/messages/:b64id/commits the thread's linked commits as JSON, with link sources. API reference →
  1. Revamp the WAL record format.

On 7/27/19 3:02 PM, Sehrope Sarkuni wrote:
> More generally, without a cryptographic MAC I don't think it's
> possible to provide any meaningful malicious tamper detection. And
> even that would have to be off-page to deal with page replay (which I
> think is out of scope).
> 
> [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CRC-32#Data_integrity

Yes, exactly -- pretty sure I made that point down thread but who knows;
I know I at least thought it ;-P

Joe

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