Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)
Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com>
From: Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com>
To: Sehrope Sarkuni <sehrope@jackdb.com>, Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
Cc: Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com>,
Tomas Vondra <tomas.vondra@2ndquadrant.com>, Antonin Houska
<ah@cybertec.at>, Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>,
Masahiko Sawada <sawada.mshk@gmail.com>, Robert Haas
<robertmhaas@gmail.com>, Haribabu Kommi <kommi.haribabu@gmail.com>,
"Moon, Insung" <Moon_Insung_i3@lab.ntt.co.jp>,
Ibrar Ahmed <ibrar.ahmad@gmail.com>,
PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>
Date: 2019-07-27T19:08:44Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers
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API reference →
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Revamp the WAL record format.
- 2c03216d8311 9.5.0 cited
On 7/27/19 3:02 PM, Sehrope Sarkuni wrote: > More generally, without a cryptographic MAC I don't think it's > possible to provide any meaningful malicious tamper detection. And > even that would have to be off-page to deal with page replay (which I > think is out of scope). > > [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CRC-32#Data_integrity Yes, exactly -- pretty sure I made that point down thread but who knows; I know I at least thought it ;-P Joe -- Crunchy Data - http://crunchydata.com PostgreSQL Support for Secure Enterprises Consulting, Training, & Open Source Development