Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com>

From: Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com>
To: Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com>, Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
Cc: Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>, Ryan Lambert <ryan@rustprooflabs.com>, Antonin Houska <ah@cybertec.at>, Masahiko Sawada <sawada.mshk@gmail.com>, Tomas Vondra <tomas.vondra@2ndquadrant.com>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>, Haribabu Kommi <kommi.haribabu@gmail.com>, "Moon, Insung" <Moon_Insung_i3@lab.ntt.co.jp>, Ibrar Ahmed <ibrar.ahmad@gmail.com>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>
Date: 2019-07-10T21:43:58Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers

Commits

Same data as JSON: GET /api/v1/messages/:b64id/commits the thread's linked commits as JSON, with link sources. API reference →
  1. Revamp the WAL record format.

On 7/10/19 3:53 PM, Alvaro Herrera wrote:
> On 2019-Jul-10, Bruce Momjian wrote:
> 
>> Good, so I think we all now agree we have to put the nonce
>> (pg_class.oid, LSN, page-number) though the cipher using the secret.

(been traveling -- just trying to get caught up on this thread)

> Actually, why do you need the page number in the nonce?  The LSN already
> distinguishes pages -- you can't have two pages with the same LSN, can
> you?  (I do think you can have multiple writes of the same page with
> different LSNs, if you change hint bits and don't write WAL about it,

Do you mean "multiple writes of the same page without..."?

> but maybe we should force CRC enabled in encrypted tables, which I think
> closes this hole?)

If we can use the LSN (perhaps with CRC) without the page number that
would seem to be a good idea.

Joe

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