Horton

Re: Preventing non-superusers from altering session authorization

Nathan Bossart <nathandbossart@gmail.com>

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From: Nathan Bossart <nathandbossart@gmail.com>
To: Joseph Koshakow <koshy44@gmail.com>
Cc: PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>
Date: 2023-06-23T17:54:16Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers 
On Thu, Jun 22, 2023 at 06:39:45PM -0400, Joseph Koshakow wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 21, 2023 at 11:48 PM Nathan Bossart <nathandbossart@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>> I see that RESET SESSION AUTHORIZATION
>> with a concurrently dropped role will FATAL with your patch but succeed
>> without it, which could be part of the reason.
> 
> That might be a good change? If the original authenticated role ID no
> longer exists then we may want to return an error when trying to set
> your session authorization to that role.

I was curious why we don't block DROP ROLE if there are active sessions for
the role or terminate any such sessions as part of the command, and I found
this discussion from 2016:

	https://postgr.es/m/flat/56E87CD8.60007%40ohmu.fi

-- 
Nathan Bossart
Amazon Web Services: https://aws.amazon.com

Commits

  1. Fix privilege check for SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION.

  2. Move privilege check for SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION.

  3. Rename session_auth_is_superuser to current_role_is_superuser.