Re: storing an explicit nonce
Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
From: Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
To: Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>, Ants Aasma <ants@cybertec.at>, Sasasu <i@sasa.su>, PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>
Date: 2021-11-12T01:04:29Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers
Commits
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the thread's linked commits as JSON, with link sources.
API reference →
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Rethink method for assigning OIDs to the template0 and postgres DBs.
- 2cb1272445d2 15.0 landed
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pg_upgrade: Preserve database OIDs.
- aa01051418f1 15.0 landed
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pg_upgrade: Preserve relfilenodes and tablespace OIDs.
- 9a974cbcba00 15.0 landed
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Fix for new Boolean node
- cf925936ecc0 15.0 cited
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Improve error handling of HMAC computations
- 5513dc6a304d 15.0 cited
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Add macro RelationIsPermanent() to report relation permanence
- 95d77149c535 14.0 landed
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Enhance nbtree index tuple deletion.
- d168b666823b 14.0 cited
On Tue, Oct 12, 2021 at 10:26:54AM -0400, Robert Haas wrote: > > specifically: Appendix C: Tweaks > > > > Quoting a couple of paragraphs from that appendix: > > > > """ > > In general, if there is information that is available and statically > > associated with a plaintext, it is recommended to use that information > > as a tweak for the plaintext. Ideally, the non-secret tweak associated > > with a plaintext is associated only with that plaintext. > > > > Extensive tweaking means that fewer plaintexts are encrypted under any > > given tweak. This corresponds, in the security model that is described > > in [1], to fewer queries to the target instance of the encryption. > > """ > > > > The gist of this being- the more diverse the tweaking being used, the > > better. That's where I was going with my "limit the risk" comment. If > > we can make the tweak vary more for a given encryption invokation, > > that's going to be better, pretty much by definition, and as explained > > in publications by NIST. > > I mean I don't have anything against that appendix, but I think we > need to understand - with confidence - what the expectations are > specifically around XTS, and that appendix seems much more general > than that. Since there has not been activity on this thread for one month, I have updated the Postgres TDE wiki to include the conclusions and discussions from this thread: https://wiki.postgresql.org/wiki/Transparent_Data_Encryption -- Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> https://momjian.us EDB https://enterprisedb.com If only the physical world exists, free will is an illusion.