Re: [PATCH] Add `verify-system` sslmode to use system CA pool for server cert

Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>

From: Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
To: thomas@habets.se
Cc: Andrew Dunstan <andrew@dunslane.net>, pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Date: 2021-10-04T21:14:36Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers
On Tue, Sep 28, 2021 at 02:54:39AM -0700, thomas@habets.se wrote:
> On Tue, 28 Sep 2021 02:09:11 +0100, Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> said:
> > I don't think public CA's are not a good idea for complex setups since
> > they open the ability for an external party to create certificates that
> > are trusted by your server's CA, e.g., certificate authentication.
> 
> I'm not arguing for, and in fact would argue against, public CA for
> client certs.
> 
> So that's a separate issue.
> 
> Note that mTLS prevents a MITM attack that exposes server data even if
> server cert is compromised or re-issued, so if the install is using
> client certs (with private CA) then the public CA for server matters
> much less.
> 
> You can end up at the wrong server, yes, and provide data as INSERT,
> but can't steal or corrupt existing data.
> 
> And you say for complex setups. Fair enough. But currently I'd say the
> default is wrong, and what should be default is not configurable.

Agreed, I think this needs much more discussion and documentation.

-- 
  Bruce Momjian  <bruce@momjian.us>        https://momjian.us
  EDB                                      https://enterprisedb.com

  If only the physical world exists, free will is an illusion.




Commits

  1. ci: Remove OpenSSL 3.1 workaround for missing system CA

  2. Fix errormessage for missing system CA in OpenSSL 3.1

  3. Add MacPorts support to src/test/ldap tests.

  4. Allow to use system CA pool for certificate verification