Re: backup manifests
Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
Commits
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the thread's linked commits as JSON, with link sources.
API reference →
-
Try to avoid compiler warnings in optimized builds.
- 05021a2c0cd2 13.0 landed
-
Fix option related issues in pg_verifybackup.
- 0a89e93bfaa6 13.0 landed
-
Add index term for backup manifest in documentation.
- 4db819ba4039 13.0 landed
-
Code review for backup manifest.
- a2ac73e7be7a 13.0 landed
-
Document the backup manifest file format.
- 149f2ae88ab0 13.0 landed
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Fix typo in pg_validatebackup documentation.
- c4f82a779d26 13.0 landed
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Exclude backup_manifest file that existed in database, from BASE_BACKUP.
- 1ec50a81ec0a 13.0 landed
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Msys2 tweaks for pg_validatebackup corruption test
- c3e4cbaab936 13.0 landed
-
Fix resource management bug with replication=database.
- 3e0d80fd8d3d 13.0 cited
-
Be more careful about time_t vs. pg_time_t in basebackup.c.
- db1531cae009 13.0 cited
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pg_validatebackup: Fix 'make clean' to remove tmp_check.
- 9f8f881caa0f 13.0 landed
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pg_validatebackup: Also use perl2host in TAP tests.
- 460314db08e8 13.0 landed
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Generate backup manifests for base backups, and validate them.
- 0d8c9c1210c4 13.0 landed
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Add checksum helper functions.
- c12e43a2e0d4 13.0 landed
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pg_waldump: Add a --quiet option.
- ac44367efbef 13.0 landed
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Catversion bump for b9b408c48724
- afb5465e0cfc 13.0 cited
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pg_basebackup: Refactor code for reading COPY and tar data.
- 431ba7bebf13 13.0 landed
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Use a ResourceOwner to track buffer pins in all cases.
- 3cb646264e8c 12.0 cited
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Use ARMv8 CRC instructions where available.
- f044d71e331d 11.0 cited
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Logical replication support for initial data copy
- 7c4f52409a8c 10.0 cited
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Use Intel SSE 4.2 CRC instructions where available.
- 3dc2d62d0486 9.5.0 cited
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Switch to CRC-32C in WAL and other places.
- 5028f22f6eb0 9.5.0 cited
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Remove support for 64-bit CRC.
- 404bc51cde9d 9.5.0 cited
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Change CRCs in WAL records from 64bit to 32bit for performance reasons.
- 21fda22ec46d 8.1.0 cited
Hi,
On 2020-03-23 12:15:54 -0400, Robert Haas wrote:
> + <varlistentry>
> + <term><literal>MANIFEST</literal></term>
> + <listitem>
> + <para>
> + When this option is specified with a value of <literal>ye'</literal>
s/ye'/yes/
> + or <literal>force-escape</literal>, a backup manifest is created
> + and sent along with the backup. The latter value forces all filenames
> + to be hex-encoded; otherwise, this type of encoding is performed only
> + for files whose names are non-UTF8 octet sequences.
> + <literal>force-escape</literal> is intended primarily for testing
> + purposes, to be sure that clients which read the backup manifest
> + can handle this case. For compatibility with previous releases,
> + the default is <literal>MANIFEST 'no'</literal>.
> + </para>
> + </listitem>
> + </varlistentry>
Are you planning to include a specification of the manifest file format
anywhere? I looked through the patches and didn't find anything.
I think it'd also be good to include more information about what the
point of manifest files actually is.
> + <para>
> + <application>pg_validatebackup</application> reads the manifest file of a
> + backup, verifies the manifest against its own internal checksum, and then
> + verifies that the same files are present in the target directory as in the
> + manifest itself. It then verifies that each file has the expected checksum,
> + unless the backup was taken the checksum algorithm set to
> + <literal>none</literal>, in which case checksum verification is not
> + performed. The presence or absence of directories is not checked, except
> + indirectly: if a directory is missing, any files it should have contained
> + will necessarily also be missing. Certain files and directories are
> + excluded from verification:
> + </para>
Depending on what you want to use the manifest for, we'd also need to
check that there are no additional files. That seems to actually be
implemented, which imo should be mentioned here.
> +/*
> + * Finalize the backup manifest, and send it to the client.
> + */
> +static void
> +SendBackupManifest(manifest_info *manifest)
> +{
> + StringInfoData protobuf;
> + uint8 checksumbuf[PG_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
> + char checksumstringbuf[PG_SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH];
> + size_t manifest_bytes_done = 0;
> +
> + /*
> + * If there is no buffile, then the user doesn't want a manifest, so
> + * don't waste any time generating one.
> + */
> + if (manifest->buffile == NULL)
> + return;
> +
> + /* Terminate the list of files. */
> + AppendStringToManifest(manifest, "],\n");
> +
> + /*
> + * Append manifest checksum, so that the problems with the manifest itself
> + * can be detected.
> + *
> + * We always use SHA-256 for this, regardless of what algorithm is chosen
> + * for checksumming the files. If we ever want to make the checksum
> + * algorithm used for the manifest file variable, the client will need a
> + * way to figure out which algorithm to use as close to the beginning of
> + * the manifest file as possible, to avoid having to read the whole thing
> + * twice.
> + */
> + manifest->still_checksumming = false;
> + pg_sha256_final(&manifest->manifest_ctx, checksumbuf);
> + AppendStringToManifest(manifest, "\"Manifest-Checksum\": \"");
> + hex_encode((char *) checksumbuf, sizeof checksumbuf, checksumstringbuf);
> + checksumstringbuf[PG_SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH - 1] = '\0';
> + AppendStringToManifest(manifest, checksumstringbuf);
> + AppendStringToManifest(manifest, "\"}\n");
Hm. Is it a great choice to include the checksum for the manifest inside
the manifest itself? With a cryptographic checksum it seems like it
could make a ton of sense to store the checksum somewhere "safe", but
keep the manifest itself alongside the base backup itself. While not
huge, they won't be tiny either.
> diff --git a/src/bin/pg_validatebackup/parse_manifest.c b/src/bin/pg_validatebackup/parse_manifest.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000..e6b42adfda
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/src/bin/pg_validatebackup/parse_manifest.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,576 @@
> +/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
> + *
> + * parse_manifest.c
> + * Parse a backup manifest in JSON format.
> + *
> + * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
> + * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
> + *
> + * src/bin/pg_validatebackup/parse_manifest.c
> + *
> + *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
> + */
Doesn't have to be in the first version, but could it be useful to move
this to common/ or such?
> +/*
> + * Validate one directory.
> + *
> + * 'relpath' is NULL if we are to validate the top-level backup directory,
> + * and otherwise the relative path to the directory that is to be validated.
> + *
> + * 'fullpath' is the backup directory with 'relpath' appended; i.e. the actual
> + * filesystem path at which it can be found.
> + */
> +static void
> +validate_backup_directory(validator_context *context, char *relpath,
> + char *fullpath)
> +{
Hm. Should this warn if the directory's permissions are set too openly
(world writable?)?
> +/*
> + * Validate the checksum of a single file.
> + */
> +static void
> +validate_file_checksum(validator_context *context, manifestfile *tabent,
> + char *fullpath)
> +{
> + pg_checksum_context checksum_ctx;
> + char *relpath = tabent->pathname;
> + int fd;
> + int rc;
> + uint8 buffer[READ_CHUNK_SIZE];
> + uint8 checksumbuf[PG_CHECKSUM_MAX_LENGTH];
> + int checksumlen;
> +
> + /* Open the target file. */
> + if ((fd = open(fullpath, O_RDONLY | PG_BINARY, 0)) < 0)
> + {
> + report_backup_error(context, "could not open file \"%s\": %m",
> + relpath);
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + /* Initialize checksum context. */
> + pg_checksum_init(&checksum_ctx, tabent->checksum_type);
> +
> + /* Read the file chunk by chunk, updating the checksum as we go. */
> + while ((rc = read(fd, buffer, READ_CHUNK_SIZE)) > 0)
> + pg_checksum_update(&checksum_ctx, buffer, rc);
> + if (rc < 0)
> + report_backup_error(context, "could not read file \"%s\": %m",
> + relpath);
> +
Hm. I think it'd be good to verify that the checksummed size is the same
as the size of the file in the manifest.
Greetings,
Andres Freund