Re: scram-sha-256 broken with FIPS and OpenSSL 1.0.2

On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 09:44:57PM +0200, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
> On 24 Sep 2020, at 21:22, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> wrote:
>> I mean, the issue here, as is so often the case, is not what is
>> actually more secure, but what meets the terms of some security
>> standard.
> 
> Correct, IIUC in order to be FIPS compliant all cryptographic modules used must
> be FIPS certified.

/me whitles, thinking about not using src/common/md5.c when building
with OpenSSL to actually get a complain if FIPS gets used.

>> At least in the US, FIPS 140-2 compliance is a reasonably
>> common need, so if we can make it easier for people who have that need
>> to be compliant, they are more likely to use PostgreSQL, which seems
>> like something that we should want.
> 
> The proposed patch makes SCRAM+FIPS work for 14, question is if we need/want to
> try and address v10-13.

Unfortunately, I don't have a good answer for that, except for the
answers involving an ABI breakage.  FWIW, the only users of those APIs
I can find in the open wild are pgpool, which actually bundles a copy
of the code in src/common/ so it does not matter, and pgbouncer, that
uses a different compatibility layer to make the code compilable:
https://sources.debian.org/src/pgbouncer/1.14.0-1/include/common/postgres_compat.h/?hl=26#L26

But it is not really possible to say if there is any closed code
relying on that, so I'd like to fix that just on HEAD, about which I
guess there would be no objections?
--
Michael