Horton

Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>

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From: Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
To: Sehrope Sarkuni <sehrope@jackdb.com>
Cc: Masahiko Sawada <sawada.mshk@gmail.com>, Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com>, Antonin Houska <ah@cybertec.at>, Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>, Tomas Vondra <tomas.vondra@2ndquadrant.com>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>, Haribabu Kommi <kommi.haribabu@gmail.com>, "Moon, Insung" <Moon_Insung_i3@lab.ntt.co.jp>, Ibrar Ahmed <ibrar.ahmad@gmail.com>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>
Date: 2019-08-12T22:32:26Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers

Commits

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  1. Revamp the WAL record format.

On Wed, Aug  7, 2019 at 08:56:18AM -0400, Sehrope Sarkuni wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 5, 2019 at 9:02 PM Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> wrote:
>     I don't think we want to add a MAC at this point since the MAC for 8k
>     pages seems unattainable.
> 
> Even without a per-page MAC, a MAC at some level for WAL has its own benefits
> such as perfect corruption detection. It could be per-record, per-N-records,
> per-checkpoint, or per-file. The current WAL file format already handles
> arbitrary gaps so there is significantly more flexibility in adding it vs
> pages. I'm not saying it should be a requirement but, unlike pages, I would not
> rule it out just yet as it may not be that complicated.

FYI, the WAL already has a CRC that detects corruption and
parially-written records (which are ignored and stop the reading of
WAL).

-- 
  Bruce Momjian  <bruce@momjian.us>        http://momjian.us
  EnterpriseDB                             http://enterprisedb.com

+ As you are, so once was I.  As I am, so you will be. +
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