Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

On Wed, Aug  7, 2019 at 05:13:31PM +0900, Masahiko Sawada wrote:
> I understood. IIUC in your approach postgres processes encrypt WAL
> records when inserting to the WAL buffer. So WAL data is encrypted
> even on the WAL buffer.
> 
> It works but I think the implementation might be complex; For example
> using openssl, we would use EVP functions to encrypt data by
> AES-256-CTR. We would need to make IV and pass it to them and these
> functions however don't manage the counter value of nonce as long as I
> didn't miss. That is, we need to calculate the correct counter value
> for each encryption and pass it to EVP functions. Suppose we encrypt
> 20 bytes of WAL. The first 16 bytes is encrypted with nonce of
> (segment_number, 0) and the next 4 bytes is encrypted with nonce of
> (segment_number, 1). After that suppose we encrypt 12 bytes of WAL. We
> cannot use nonce of (segment_number, 2) but should use nonce of
> (segment_number , 1). Therefore we would need 4 bytes padding and to
> encrypt it and then to throw that 4 bytes away .

Since we want to have per-byte control over encryption, for both
heap/index pages (skip LSN and CRC), and WAL (encrypt to the last byte),
I assumed we would need to generate a bit stream of a specified size and
do the XOR ourselves against the data.  I assume ssh does this, so we
would have to study the method.

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  Bruce Momjian  <bruce@momjian.us>        http://momjian.us
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