Horton

Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>

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From: Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
To: Tomas Vondra <tomas.vondra@2ndquadrant.com>
Cc: Antonin Houska <ah@cybertec.at>, Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com>, Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>, Masahiko Sawada <sawada.mshk@gmail.com>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>, Haribabu Kommi <kommi.haribabu@gmail.com>, "Moon, Insung" <Moon_Insung_i3@lab.ntt.co.jp>, Ibrar Ahmed <ibrar.ahmad@gmail.com>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>
Date: 2019-07-25T18:33:57Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers

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Same data as JSON: GET /api/v1/messages/:b64id/commits the thread's linked commits as JSON, with link sources. API reference →

  1. Revamp the WAL record format.

On Fri, Jul 19, 2019 at 01:59:41PM +0200, Tomas Vondra wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 19, 2019 at 12:04:36PM +0200, Antonin Houska wrote:
> > We can guarantee integrity and authenticity of backup, but that's a separate
> > feature: someone may need this although it's o.k. for him to run the cluster
> > unencrypted.

> Yes, I do agree with that. I think attempts to guarantee data authenticity
> and/or integrity at the page level is mostly futile (replay attacks are an
> example of why). IMHO we should consider that to be outside the threat
> model TDE is expected to address.

Yes, I think we can say that checksums _help_ detect unauthorized
database changes, and usually detects database corruption, but it isn't
a fully secure solution.

-- 
  Bruce Momjian  <bruce@momjian.us>        http://momjian.us
  EnterpriseDB                             http://enterprisedb.com

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