Horton

Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>

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From: Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
To: Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com>
Cc: Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>, Ryan Lambert <ryan@rustprooflabs.com>, Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com>, Antonin Houska <ah@cybertec.at>, Masahiko Sawada <sawada.mshk@gmail.com>, Tomas Vondra <tomas.vondra@2ndquadrant.com>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>, Haribabu Kommi <kommi.haribabu@gmail.com>, "Moon, Insung" <Moon_Insung_i3@lab.ntt.co.jp>, Ibrar Ahmed <ibrar.ahmad@gmail.com>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>
Date: 2019-07-10T19:56:23Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers

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  1. Revamp the WAL record format.

Greetings,

* Alvaro Herrera (alvherre@2ndquadrant.com) wrote:
> On 2019-Jul-10, Bruce Momjian wrote:
> 
> > Good, so I think we all now agree we have to put the nonce
> > (pg_class.oid, LSN, page-number) though the cipher using the secret.
> 
> Actually, why do you need the page number in the nonce?  The LSN already
> distinguishes pages -- you can't have two pages with the same LSN, can
> you?  (I do think you can have multiple writes of the same page with
> different LSNs, if you change hint bits and don't write WAL about it,
> but maybe we should force CRC enabled in encrypted tables, which I think
> closes this hole?)

The point about the LSN not changing is definitely a very good one..  I
agree that we should require checksums to deal with that possibility.

Thanks,

Stephen