Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>

From: Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
To: Ryan Lambert <ryan@rustprooflabs.com>
Cc: Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>, Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com>, Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com>, Antonin Houska <ah@cybertec.at>, Masahiko Sawada <sawada.mshk@gmail.com>, Tomas Vondra <tomas.vondra@2ndquadrant.com>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>, Haribabu Kommi <kommi.haribabu@gmail.com>, "Moon, Insung" <Moon_Insung_i3@lab.ntt.co.jp>, Ibrar Ahmed <ibrar.ahmad@gmail.com>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>
Date: 2019-07-10T18:57:54Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers

Commits

Same data as JSON: GET /api/v1/messages/:b64id/commits the thread's linked commits as JSON, with link sources. API reference →
  1. Revamp the WAL record format.

Greetings,

* Ryan Lambert (ryan@rustprooflabs.com) wrote:
> > I didn't either, except it was referenced above as "forward hash".  I
> > don't know why that was suggested, which is why I listed it as an
> > option/suggestion.
> 
> My bad, sorry for the confusion!  I meant to say "cipher" not "hash".  I
> was (trying to) refer to the method of generating unpredictable IV from
> nonces using the forward cipher function and the encryption key.
> Too many closely related words with very specific meanings.

No worries, just want to try and be clear on these things..  Too easy to
mistakenly think that doing this very-similar-thing will be as secure as
doing the recommended-thing (particularly when the recommended-thing is
a lot harder...), and we don't want to end up doing that and then
discovering it isn't actually secure..

Thanks!

Stephen