Horton

Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>

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From: Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
To: Ryan Lambert <ryan@rustprooflabs.com>
Cc: Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com>, Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com>, Antonin Houska <ah@cybertec.at>, Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>, Masahiko Sawada <sawada.mshk@gmail.com>, Tomas Vondra <tomas.vondra@2ndquadrant.com>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>, Haribabu Kommi <kommi.haribabu@gmail.com>, "Moon, Insung" <Moon_Insung_i3@lab.ntt.co.jp>, Ibrar Ahmed <ibrar.ahmad@gmail.com>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>
Date: 2019-07-10T18:41:44Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers

Commits

Same data as JSON: GET /api/v1/messages/:b64id/commits the thread's linked commits as JSON, with link sources. API reference →

  1. Revamp the WAL record format.

On Wed, Jul 10, 2019 at 12:38:02PM -0600, Ryan Lambert wrote:
> 
>     what is it that gets stored in the page for
>     decryption use, the nonce or the IV derived from it?
> 
> 
> I believe storing the IV is preferable and still secure per [1]: "The IV need
> not be secret"
> 
> Beyond needing the database oid, if every decrypt function has to regenerate
> the IV from the nonce that will affect performance.  I don't know how expensive
> the forward hash is but it won't be free.

Well, I think we have three options.  We have 3 4-byte integers
(pg_class.oid, LSN, page-number) that could be concatenated to be the
IV, we could run those through a hash, or we could run them through the
encryption function with the secret.

-- 
  Bruce Momjian  <bruce@momjian.us>        http://momjian.us
  EnterpriseDB                             http://enterprisedb.com

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