Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)
Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
From: Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
To: Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com>
Cc: Masahiko Sawada <sawada.mshk@gmail.com>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>, Tomas Vondra <tomas.vondra@2ndquadrant.com>, Antonin Houska <ah@cybertec.at>, Haribabu Kommi <kommi.haribabu@gmail.com>, "Moon, Insung" <Moon_Insung_i3@lab.ntt.co.jp>, Ibrar Ahmed <ibrar.ahmad@gmail.com>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>
Date: 2019-07-05T19:41:16Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers
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Revamp the WAL record format.
- 2c03216d8311 9.5.0 cited
On Sun, Jun 16, 2019 at 07:07:20AM -0400, Joe Conway wrote: > On 6/15/19 9:28 PM, Bruce Momjian wrote: > > There are no known non-exhaustive plaintext attacks on AES: > > > > https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/1512/why-is-aes-resistant-to-known-plaintext-attacks > > Even that non-authoritative stackexchange thread has varying opinions. > Surely you don't claim that limiting know plaintext as much as is > practical is a bad idea in general. AES is used to encrypt TLS/https, and web traffic is practically always mostly-known plaintext. I don't know of any cases where only part of a webpage is encrypted by TLS to avoid encrypting known plaintext. -- Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> http://momjian.us EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com + As you are, so once was I. As I am, so you will be. + + Ancient Roman grave inscription +