Horton

Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>

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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com>
Cc: Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>, Masahiko Sawada <sawada.mshk@gmail.com>, "Moon, Insung" <Moon_Insung_i3@lab.ntt.co.jp>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>
Date: 2018-06-20T22:28:43Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers

Commits

Same data as JSON: GET /api/v1/messages/:b64id/commits the thread's linked commits as JSON, with link sources. API reference →

  1. Revamp the WAL record format.

On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 06:19:40PM -0400, Joe Conway wrote:
> On 06/20/2018 05:12 PM, Bruce Momjian wrote:
> > On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 11:06:20AM -0400, Joe Conway wrote:
> > Even if they are encrypted with the same key, they use different
> > initialization vectors that are stored inside the encrypted payload, so
> > you really can't identify much except the length, as Robert stated.

Definitely use different IVs, and don't reuse them (or use cipher modes
where IV reuse is not fatal).

> The more you encrypt with a single key, the more fuel you give to the
> person trying to solve for the key with cryptanalysis.

With modern 128-bit block ciphers in modern cipher modes you'd have to
encrypt enough data to make this not a problem.  On the other hand,
you'll still have other reasons to do key rotation.  Key rotation
ultimately means re-encrypting everything.  Getting all of this right is
very difficult.

So again, what's the threat model?  Because if it's sysadmins/DBAs
you're afraid of, there are better things to do.

Nico
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