Re: WIP: Data at rest encryption
Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com>
From: Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com>
To: Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
Cc: Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>, Peter Eisentraut <peter.eisentraut@2ndquadrant.com>, Ants Aasma <ants.aasma@eesti.ee>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>
Date: 2017-06-15T23:51:36Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers
Bruce Momjian wrote: > On Thu, Jun 15, 2017 at 07:27:55PM -0400, Stephen Frost wrote: > > I expect the same would happen with the shell-command approach suggested > > up-thread and the prompt-on-stdin approach too, they aren't great but I > > expect users would still use the feature. As Robert and I have > > mentioned, there is a good bit of value to having this feature simply > > because it avoids the need to get someone with root privileges to set up > > an encrypted volume and I don't think having to use a shell command or > > providing the password on stdin at startup really changes that very > > much. > > Understood, but now you are promoting a feature with an admittedly-poor > API, duplication of an OS feature, and perhaps an invasive change to the > code. Those are high hurdles. I thought we called it "incremental development". From the opposite point of view, would you say we should ban use of passphrase-protected SSL key files because the current user interface for them is bad? I have no use for data-at-rest encryption myself, but I wouldn't stop development just because the initial design proposal doesn't include top-notch key management. -- Álvaro Herrera https://www.2ndQuadrant.com/ PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services
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