Horton

Re: pg_authid.rolpassword format (was Re: Password identifiers, protocol aging and SCRAM protocol)

Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>

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From: Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
To: Magnus Hagander <magnus@hagander.net>
Cc: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>, Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>, Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>, Peter Eisentraut <peter.eisentraut@2ndquadrant.com>, David Steele <david@pgmasters.net>, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>, David Fetter <david@fetter.org>, Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com>, Julian Markwort <julian.markwort@uni-muenster.de>, Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>, PostgreSQL mailing lists <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>, Valery Popov <v.popov@postgrespro.ru>
Date: 2016-12-14T18:12:05Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers 
On Wed, Dec 14, 2016 at 11:27:15AM +0100, Magnus Hagander wrote:
> I would so like to just drop support for plain passwords completely :) But
> there's a backwards compatibility issue to think about of course.
> 
> But -- is there any actual usecase for them anymore?

I thought we recommended 'password' for SSL connections because if you
use MD5 passwords the password text layout is known and that simplifies
cryptanalysis.

-- 
  Bruce Momjian  <bruce@momjian.us>        http://momjian.us
  EnterpriseDB                             http://enterprisedb.com

+ As you are, so once was I.  As I am, so you will be. +
+                      Ancient Roman grave inscription +

Commits

  1. Support SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication (RFC 5802 and 7677).

  2. Refactor SHA2 functions and move them to src/common/.

  3. Replace isMD5() with a more future-proof way to check if pw is encrypted.

  4. Remove bogus notice that older clients might not work with MD5 passwords.

  5. Refactor the code for verifying user's password.

  6. Replace PostmasterRandom() with a stronger source, second attempt.

  7. Remove support for (insecure) crypt authentication.