Horton

Re: Password identifiers, protocol aging and SCRAM protocol

Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>

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From: Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
To: Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>
Cc: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>, David Steele <david@pgmasters.net>, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>, David Fetter <david@fetter.org>, Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com>, Magnus Hagander <magnus@hagander.net>, Peter Eisentraut <peter.eisentraut@2ndquadrant.com>, Julian Markwort <julian.markwort@uni-muenster.de>, PostgreSQL mailing lists <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>, Valery Popov <v.popov@postgrespro.ru>
Date: 2016-09-28T19:06:43Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers 
Heikki, Michael, Magnus,

* Michael Paquier (michael.paquier@gmail.com) wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 10:42 PM, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi> wrote:
> > The libpq-side is not. Just calling random() won't do. We haven't needed for
> > random numbers in libpq before, but now we do. Is the pgcrypto solution
> > portable enough that we can use it in libpq?
> 
> Do you think that urandom would be enough then? The last time I took a
> look at that, I saw urandom on all modern platforms even those ones:
> OpenBSD, NetBSD, Solaris, SunOS. For Windows the CryptGen stuff would
> be nice enough I guess..

Magnus had been working on a patch that, as I recall, he thought was
portable and I believe could be used on both sides.

Magnus, would what you were working on be helpful here...?

Thanks!

Stephen

Commits

  1. Support SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication (RFC 5802 and 7677).

  2. Refactor SHA2 functions and move them to src/common/.

  3. Replace isMD5() with a more future-proof way to check if pw is encrypted.

  4. Remove bogus notice that older clients might not work with MD5 passwords.

  5. Refactor the code for verifying user's password.

  6. Replace PostmasterRandom() with a stronger source, second attempt.

  7. Remove support for (insecure) crypt authentication.