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Re: Securing "make check" (CVE-2014-0067)

Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>

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From: Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
To: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Cc: Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>, Andrew Dunstan <andrew@dunslane.net>, Magnus Hagander <magnus@hagander.net>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>
Date: 2014-03-03T07:50:21Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers 
* Tom Lane (tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote:
> Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com> writes:
> > Concerning the immediate fix for non-Windows systems, does any modern system
> > ignore modes of Unix domain sockets?  It appears to be a long-fixed problem:
> 
> What I was envisioning was that we'd be relying on the permissions of the
> containing directory to keep out bad guys.  Permissions on the socket
> itself might be sufficient, but what does it save us to assume that?

Agreed- the general approach to this, from what I've seen, is to handle
it with the directory.

	Thanks,

		Stephen

Commits

Same data as JSON: GET /api/v1/messages/:b64id/commits the thread's linked commits as JSON, with link sources. API reference →

  1. Have config_sspi_auth() permit IPv6 localhost connections.

  2. Lock down regression testing temporary clusters on Windows.

  3. Use a separate temporary directory for the Unix-domain socket

  4. Secure Unix-domain sockets of "make check" temporary clusters.