Re: system administration functions with hardcoded superuser checks
Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>
From: Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>
To: Peter Eisentraut <peter_e@gmx.net>
Cc: pgsql-hackers <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>
Date: 2012-12-19T00:41:58Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers
On Tue, Dec 18, 2012 at 12:09:10PM -0500, Peter Eisentraut wrote: > There are some system administration functions that have hardcoded > superuser checks, specifically: > > pg_reload_conf > pg_rotate_logfile > pg_read_file > pg_read_file_all > pg_read_binary_file > pg_read_binary_file_all > pg_stat_file > pg_ls_dir > > Some of these are useful in monitoring or maintenance tools, and the > hardcoded superuser checks require that these tools run with maximum > privileges. Couldn't we just install these functions without default > privileges and allow users to grant privileges as necessary? +1. You can already use a SECURITY DEFINER wrapper, so I don't think this opens any particular floodgate. GRANT is a nicer interface. However, I would not advertise this as a replacement for wrapper functions until pg_dump can preserve ACL changes to pg_catalog objects.