Re: ALTER ROLE/DATABASE RESET ALL versus security

Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>

From: Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
To: Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@commandprompt.com>
Cc: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>, pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org
Date: 2010-02-27T03:38:49Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers
Alvaro Herrera wrote:
> Tom Lane wrote:
> > Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@commandprompt.com> writes:
> > > Tom Lane wrote:
> > >> It looks to me like the code in AlterSetting() will allow an ordinary
> > >> user to blow away all settings for himself.  Even those that are for
> > >> SUSET variables and were presumably set for him by a superuser.  Isn't
> > >> this a security hole?  I would expect that an unprivileged user should
> > >> not be able to change such settings, not even to the extent of
> > >> reverting to the installation-wide default.
> > 
> > > Yes, it is, but this is not a new hole.  This works just fine in 8.4
> > > too:
> > 
> > So I'd argue for changing it in 8.4 too.
> 
> Understood.  I'm starting to look at what this requires.

Any progress on this?

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