Re: ALTER ROLE/DATABASE RESET ALL versus security
Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
From: Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
To: Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@commandprompt.com>
Cc: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>, pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org
Date: 2010-02-27T03:38:49Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers
Alvaro Herrera wrote: > Tom Lane wrote: > > Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@commandprompt.com> writes: > > > Tom Lane wrote: > > >> It looks to me like the code in AlterSetting() will allow an ordinary > > >> user to blow away all settings for himself. Even those that are for > > >> SUSET variables and were presumably set for him by a superuser. Isn't > > >> this a security hole? I would expect that an unprivileged user should > > >> not be able to change such settings, not even to the extent of > > >> reverting to the installation-wide default. > > > > > Yes, it is, but this is not a new hole. This works just fine in 8.4 > > > too: > > > > So I'd argue for changing it in 8.4 too. > > Understood. I'm starting to look at what this requires. Any progress on this? -- Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> http://momjian.us EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com PG East: http://www.enterprisedb.com/community/nav-pg-east-2010.do + If your life is a hard drive, Christ can be your backup. +