Horton

Re: Rejecting weak passwords

Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>

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From: Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
To: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Cc: Peter Eisentraut <peter_e@gmx.net>, Dave Page <dpage@pgadmin.org>, Marko Kreen <markokr@gmail.com>, Albe Laurenz <laurenz.albe@wien.gv.at>, Andrew Dunstan <andrew@dunslane.net>, mlortiz <mlortiz@uci.cu>, Magnus Hagander <magnus@hagander.net>, pgsql-hackers <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>
Date: 2009-10-14T22:44:47Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers 
* Tom Lane (tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote:
> Peter Eisentraut <peter_e@gmx.net> writes:
> > Well, you would lose anyway if the DBA switches the pg_hba.conf setting
> > from md5 to password without telling you.
> 
> True :-(.  Anybody for a zero-knowledge protocol?
> 
> (Realistically, non-password-based auth methods are the only real
> solution here, I fear.  We should probably be doing more to encourage
> people to use SSL-cert-based authentication in low-trust situations.)

Or GSSAPI..  Helping users understand how they can leverage their
existing Kerberos or MS SSPI single-sign-on infrastructures to securely
access PG would go a long way to reducing the password-based usage out
there, imo.  Of course, it'd be nice if we supported GSSAPI encrypted
transport too.  Separating the encryption into SSL is less than ideal.

	Stephen