Thread

  1. Re: [HACKERS] Postgres acl (fwd)

    Bruce Momjian <maillist@candle.pha.pa.us> — 1998-01-06T19:21:32Z

    > 
    > On Tue, 6 Jan 1998, Bruce Momjian wrote:
    > 
    > > > 
    > > > On Tue, 6 Jan 1998, Bruce Momjian wrote:
    > > > 
    > > > > Can someone who has permission to create databases be trusted not to
    > > > > delete others?  If we say no, how do we make sure they can change
    > > > > pg_database rows on only databases that they own?
    > > > 
    > > > 	deleting a database is accomplished using 'drop database', no?
    > > > Can the code for that not be modified to see whether the person dropping
    > > > the database is the person that owns it *or* pgsuperuser?
    > > 
    > > It already does the check, but issues an SQL from the C code to delete
    > > from pg_database.  I believe any user who can create a database can
    > > issue the same SQL command from psql, bypassing the drop database
    > > checks, no?
    > 
    > 	Okay, I understand what you mean here...so I guess the next
    > question is should system tables be directly modifyable by non-superuser?
    > 
    > 	For instance, we have a 'drop database' SQL command...can we
    > restrict 'delete from pg_database' to just superuser, while leaving 'drop
    > database' open to those with createdb privileges?  Same with 'create
    > user', and, possible, a 'create group' command instead of 'insert into
    > pg_group'?
    
    Yes, we must replace the SQL commands in commands/dbcommands.c with
    lower-level C table access routines so we do not have to go to the
    executor, where the access permissions are checked.
    
    -- 
    Bruce Momjian
    maillist@candle.pha.pa.us