Re: random() (was Re: New GUC to sample log queries)

I wrote:
> Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@enterprisedb.com> writes:
>> +1, but I wonder if just separating them is enough.  Is our seeding
>> algorithm good enough for this new purpose?  The initial seed is 100%
>> predictable to a logged in user (it's made from the backend PID and
>> backend start time, which we tell you), and not even that hard to
>> guess from the outside, so I think Coverity's warning is an
>> understatement in this case.  Even if we separate the PRNG state used
>> for internal stuff so that users can't clobber its seed from SQL,
>> wouldn't it be possible to predict which statements will survive the
>> log sampling filter given easily available information and a good
>> guess at how many times random() (or whatever similar thing) has been
>> called so far?

> Yeah, that's a good point.  Maybe we should upgrade the per-process
> seed initialization to make it less predictable.  I could see expending
> a call of the strong RNG to contribute some more noise to the seeds
> selected in InitProcessGlobals().

Here's a simple patch to do so.

Looking at this, I seem to remember that we considered doing exactly this
awhile ago, but refrained because there was concern about depleting the
system's reserve of entropy if we have a high backend spawn rate, and it
didn't seem like there was a security reason to insist on unpredictable
random() results.  However, the log-sampling patch destroys the latter
argument.  As for the former argument, I'm not sure how big a deal that
really is.  Presumably, the act of spawning a backend would itself
contribute some more entropy to the pool (particularly if a network
connection is involved), so the depletion problem might be fictitious
in the first place.  Also, a few references I consulted, such as the
Linux urandom(4) man page, suggest that even in a depleted-entropy
state the results of reading /dev/urandom should be random enough
for all but the very strictest security requirements.

Thoughts?

			regards, tom lane