Re: Rejecting weak passwords

Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>

From: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
To: Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Mielke <mark@mark.mielke.cc>, Dave Page <dpage@pgadmin.org>, Kevin Grittner <Kevin.Grittner@wicourts.gov>, Andrew Dunstan <andrew@dunslane.net>, Marko Kreen <markokr@gmail.com>, Magnus Hagander <magnus@hagander.net>, Greg Stark <gsstark@mit.edu>, Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>, pgsql-hackers <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>, mlortiz <mlortiz@uci.cu>, Albe Laurenz <laurenz.albe@wien.gv.at>
Date: 2009-10-15T17:43:51Z
Lists: pgsql-hackers
Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> writes:
> If we were using some kind of real public key system and someone
> suggested breaking it to add password complexity checking, I would
> understand the outrage here.  But I don't understand why everyone is
> so worked up about having an *optional* *flag* to force plaintext
> instead of MD5.  I might be wrong here, but can't a determined
> attacker brute-force an MD5 anyway?  The very fact that people are
> suggesting that password checking might be feasible even on a
> pre-MD5'd password by using a dictionary suggests that we're not
> getting a whole lot of real security here.  And even if not, dude,
> it's an *optional* *flag*.

Yes, and it's an optional flag that could perfectly well be implemented
in the plugin that I think we do have consensus to add a hook for.
The argument is over why do we need to litter the core system with it.

			regards, tom lane